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Biases to favour self-related information over information related to other people have
been demonstrated across a range of both high- and low-level tasks, but it is unclear
whether these tasks ‘tap’ the same types of self representation. Here we assess results
from two patients with damage primarily to (i) left ventro-medial prefrontal (vmPFC) cortex
and the insula (patient SC), and (ii) temporo-parietal (TP) cortex (patient RR). We report
evidence from both low-level perceptual matching tasks and episodic memory showing
that SC has a hypoself bias across the tasks. RR in contrast had a hyperself bias confined to
perceptual matching. Both patients also showed hypobias effects for reward. We argue that
the different brain lesions compromise (i) the use of a core self-representation which
modulates both perceptual and memorial levels of processing (the vmPFC), and (ii) atten-
tional responses to social cues (the TP cortex), and, furthermore, these effects can disso-
ciate from those of reward and general effects of brain lesion and/or impaired executive
control. We suggest that the vmPFC is critical for access to a core self-representation while
TP damage can reduce top-down control of attention to salient stimuli and exaggerates the
effects of strong (self-related) attentional signals.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There is now a large amount of evidence indicating that in-
dividuals are biased in responding to information relating to
themselves compared with information relating to other
people. These bias effect emerge upon a wide range of tasks.
For example, participants better remember information when
judgements are referred to the self compared to when judge-
ments are made in reference to other people (e.g.,
Cunningham, Turk, & Macrae, 2008; see Symons & Johnson,
1997, for a review). Individuals tend to rate traits more
favourably in relation to themselves compared with othersrimental Psychology, Un
Sui), glyn.humphreys@ps
rved.(Klein, Loftus,& Burton, 1989). Responses to images of our own
faces are faster than to images of other peoples' faces (Ma &
Han, 2010; Sui, Liu, & Han, 2009), and images of our own face
are difficult to ignore (e.g., Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006). Self-biases
can also modulate lower level tasks such as perceptual
matching. For example, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) had
participants associate a label with a shape (you-circle, friend-
square, stranger-triangle). Subsequently they had to decide
whether shape-label pairswere the same initially shown (you-
circle, friend-square) or whether they were re-paired (you-
square, friend-circle). Matching times were substantially
faster and more accurate for self-related stimuli than for
stimuli related to other people. This advantage foriversity of Oxford, South Parks Road, OX1 3UD, Oxford, UK.
yox.ac.uk (G.W. Humphreys).
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with the contrast of the shapes (self-related shapes were less
affected by lowering the luminance of the stimuli), consistent
with an effect on perceptual processing of the stimuli.
One question that arises from this work is whether these
different self-bias effects reflect the same underlying infor-
mation about the self. It has long been argued that different
characteristics of the self can be distinguished. For example,
William James (1890) separated between a physical repre-
sentation of the self, mental representations and spiritual
aspects. Georg Northoff (2013) discusses the self as a mental
entity, a phenomenal experience, as a pre-reflective, implicit
coding of experience, and as a social realised representation.
Other researchers distinguish a true from an outer self (e.g.,
Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014) and between cognitive and
affective components of the self (Moran, Macrae, Heatherton,
Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). Whether there is some common
representation that cuts-across these distinctions is a moot
point. At a pragmatic level, however, we can ask whether the
self information that is accessed in high-level memory and
trait-judgement tasks reflects the same information that
mediates lower-level perceptual judgements.
One reason to argue for self-based processing relying on
some common representation relates to the neural correlates
of self processing. For example, it has been found that tasks as
dissimilar as making high-level judgements about the self
(e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005) and
perceptual matching of shapes and labels (Sui, Rotshtein, &
Humphreys, 2013) all involve activation of the ventro-medial
pre-frontal cortex (vmPFC), and that this activation is
distinct from activation in other brain areas [e.g., the pre-
cuneus, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)], which
can be differentiated across the tasks (e.g., Moran et al., 2006;
Sui et al., 2013). In interpreting their fMRI on the shape-label
perceptual matching task, Sui et al. (2013) argued that
greater activation for self stimuli over stimuli related to other
people in the vmPFC stemmed from activation of self repre-
sentations, while the similarly enhanced activation of the
pSTS was due to increased attentional sensitivity to self-
related stimuli.
In the present study we assessed whether there were
common representations for the self in high- and low-level
tasks by evaluating the effects of brain lesion on self-related
processing. We report data from two patients, one with le-
sions specifically involving the left vmPFC and a second with
lesions affecting left temporo-parietal cortex (TPC). Perfor-
mance was examined in high-level memory tasks, where pa-
tientsmadeself-other judgements about stimuli andwere then
probed for recall and recognition (see Cunningham et al., 2008;
Sui&Humphreys, 2013; Van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway,&
Turk, 2010), and in the lower-level shape-label perceptual
matching taskof Sui et al. (2012).Wehypothesized thatdamage
to the vmPFC may selectively disrupt access to core represen-
tations of the self, recruited for both high- and low-level tasks.
If this is the case, then there may be a reduction in the normal
self-modulation of performance for a patient with damage to
this region, and this should affect memory and perceptual
matchingalike. In contrast,wepropose that theTPC is involved
in modulating the attentional response to self-related stimuli.
Here the direction of the effects is difficult to predict. Onepossibility is that self-biaseswill be reduceddue to problems in
tuning neurons to self-related items in the environment. A
contrasting view is that a reduction in the ability to tune
attentionmay lead to a greater effect of prepotent responses to
the self-related stimuli over stimuli related to other people,
since there may be few processes resources available for top-
down modulation of a response to the self. In this case, a pa-
tient with TPC damage may show stronger self-biases, at least
in tasks that are strongly determined by attention to the
stimuli. We hypothesized that such effects should emerge on
the perceptual matching task, where attention to the shape-
label combination is an important determiner of performance
(see Sui, Yankouskaya, & Humphreys, 2015, for converging
evidence). On the other hand, variations in attention should be
less critical in a memory task following referential processing
in relation to the self or other people, where a single item is
presented on each trial and an explicit judgement must be
made in relation to it. Here modulation of memory perfor-
mance by the self may be relatively normal, even in a patient
with TPC damage.
The effects for the self on perceptual matching were con-
trasted with the effects of perceptual matching with reward-
related stimuli. One influential account of why self biases
merge is that self-related stimuli are inherently rewarding,
and so self-biases reflect biases in perception and memory to
reward (Northoff&Hayes, 2011). Sui et al. used the associative
matching task but paired shapes with different reward values
rather than personal labels (e.g., £8-circle; £2-square; £0.5-
triangle). After forming the associations participants had to
judge whether shape-value pairings matched the original
presentation (£8-circle, £2-square), or whether the shape-
evalue pairs were re-arranged (£8-square, £2-circle). At the
end of the experiment participants were also given real re-
wards for each correct response, with the rewards matching
the relative values from the different trials. Similarly to the
advantage for self-related stimuli over stimuli related to other
people, Sui et al. found an advantage for high reward stimuli
over low reward pairs. Also this advantage interacted with the
manipulation of the contrast of the shapes (high reward
shapes showed weaker effects of low contrast). If the self-bias
effect and the reward-bias effect stem from a common un-
derlying factor, then we would expect them to be affected
similarly by brain lesions. On the other hand, if the underlying
factors differ, then it is possible that the effects with the self
and reward may dissociate across patients. For example, pa-
tientsmay show an abnormal self-bias [either larger (hyper) or
smaller (hypo) than normal] but normal effects for reward
associations. It is also possible that theremay be dissociations
in which a hyperself bias for one factor is combined with a
hypo reward-bias for the other. Such dissociation would pro-
vide important evidence that self-bias and reward-bias are not
reflecting the same factor.2. Case reports
SC was a right-handed 64 year old male suffered a stroke in
February 2012. Fig. 1A illustrates SC's reconstructed lesion
map using his MRI scan (3T). His lesion included the left
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the insula extending into
Fig. 1 e (A) ST's lesion and (B) RR's lesions reconstructed using voxel-based morphological analysis relative to control MR
scans. Red represents the lesion of grey matter and white matter. The lesion maps were reconstructed by using a modified
segmentation procedure and an outlier detection algorithm based on fuzzy clustering (Seghier, Ramlackhansingh, Crinion,
Leff, & Price, 2008). This procedure identified voxels that are different in the lesioned brain as compared with a set of 100
healthy controls using normalized gray matter and white matter. The gray matter and white matter outlier voxels are then
combined into a single outlier image and threshold to generate a binary map of the lesion. The result of lesion
reconstruction was verified against each patient's T1 scan with a threshold of FEW p ¼ .05 with ≥100 voxels.
Table 1 e Summary of performance on the Oxford
Cognitive Screen (OCS).
Patient SC RR
Sub-test:
Picture naming (N ¼ 3) 1 0
Semantic recognition (N ¼ 2) 2 2
Orientation in time and space (N ¼ 6) 6 4
Visual fields (N ¼ 4) 4 4
Reading (N ¼ 15) 0 0
Writing numbers (N ¼ 2) 2 0
Calculations (N ¼ 4) 4 4
Hearts cancellation spatial asymmetry (control ¼ 0) ¡8 0
Imitation (N ¼ 12) 11 8
Recognition memory (N ¼ 4) 2 0
Trail making (executive score) (control ¼ 1) 4 7
Note. The performance on OCS taken within 7 days on the stroke.
The OCS contains 11 sub-tests requiring (i) naming of 3 low fre-
quency pictures (picture naming); (ii) pointing to a named picture
amongst semantic distractors (semantic recognition); (iii) forced-
choice responses to time and place (orientation in time and
space); (iv) visual field confrontation test; (v) reading a passage with
regular and irregular words; (vi) writing two numbers; (vii) simple
calculations; (viii) cancelling complete hearts and not distractors
with a left or right break; (ix) imitating meaningless gestures; (x)
recognition memory for words in the reading passage; (xi) the dif-
ference between switch and non-switch conditions of a trails test
(executive score). In brackets are maximum performance scores. In
bold are scores that fall outside the level of age and education
matched controls.
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deficits showing poor performance on the Hayling test
(Burgesss & Shallice, 1997) and making multiple rule viola-
tions when carrying out the Tower of Hanoi under clinical
testing conditions. He also had some word finding difficulties,
poor reading, a right-side spatial bias on cancellation and
impaired verbal recognitionmemory. His scores on the Oxford
Cognitive Screen (OCS; Demeyere et al., in press) (marked
relative to age-matched norms) are shown in Table 1. On
clinical tests of social cognition SC had difficulties in per-
forming first-order Theory of Mind tasks (Samson, Apperly,
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004).
RR, a former a professional accountant was a right-handed
32 year old male. He suffered a stroke in May 2012. Fig. 1B
shows the lesion map reconstructed using RR's MRI scan (3T),
with the lesion including the left inferior parietal and superior
temporal regions extending into the frontal cortex. The lesion
size in these critical regions (the vmPFC and pSTS) is reported
in Table 2. RR suffered from severe expressive aphasia, a very
poor verbal working memory (matching span 2), some prob-
lems in comprehending low imagery words and dyscalculia.
His performance on the OCS is also given in Table 1. When
initially screened there was impaired naming, reading,
writing, verbal recognition memory and executive
performance.
Experiment 1. Perceptual matching of self and reward
In the perceptual matching task, we tested whether SC and
RR showed normal or abnormal biases in the associative
Table 2 e The number of lesioned voxels in the vmPFC, left
insula, and left posterior parietal-temporal regions. The
result of lesion reconstruction was verified against RR and
SC's T1 scan with a threshold of FEW p ¼ .05 with >100
voxels as compared with a set of 100 healthy controls
using normalized gray matter and white matter.
RR SC
Medial prefrontal cortex 0 6176
Left angular 2776 0
Left posterior superior temporal region 17,624 2272
Left insula 10,792 12,008
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required shapes to be associated and then matched with
personal labels (you, stranger) or with different reward values
(£8 and £0.5). For the reward associations, participants
receivedmonetary rewards linked to the associated values for
making correct responses to those stimuli in the matching
task.3. Method
Stimuli and tasks. There were two sessions. One involved the
personal association task only, the other involved both per-
sonal and reward associations. The two sessions took place at
least 2 weeks apart. In the personal association session, RR and
age-matched control participants received three geometric
shapes (triangle, circle, square) randomly assigned to labels
corresponding to three people (self, friend, or stranger).
Associative matching of three shapes and labels was difficult
for SC and so for him we required only two associations to be
learned; two shapes (triangle and circle) were randomly
assigned to the labels for two people (self and friend). Again a
similar procedure was followed with age-matched controls.
In the personal-reward association session we directly
compared associative learning and matching with personal
labels and reward values. Four out of six geometric shapes
(triangle, circle, square, hexagon, pentagon, and ellipse) were
randomly assigned to two personal labels (self and stranger) in
the personal associative task (2 shapes), and to the two reward
values (£8 and £0.5) in the reward associative task (2 other
shapes). The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced
across patients and controls.
After the shape-label associative instruction in each task,
participants had to carry out a shape-label matching task to
discriminate whether pairings of shapes and labels matched,
using one of two keys to respond for match and mismatch
trials. In the perceptual matching tasks, the shapes were
3.8  3.8 in size and appeared above a white central fixation
cross (.8  .8). A white label stating either ‘You’, ‘Friend’, or
‘Stranger’ (in the personal association task) or ‘£8’ or ‘£0.5’ (in
the reward association task) was shown below fixation and
covered an area of 1.8~3.6  1.6. Participants received dif-
ferential reward values at the end of the reward task reflecting
the number of correct responses they made, weighted by the
two types of reward association (e.g., an £8 match trial pro-
duced 16 times the reward of a £0.5 match trial). All stimuli
were displayed on a grey background. E-prime software(version 2.0) was used to present the stimuli and to record the
responses. The experiment was run on a PC with a 24-in.
monitor and a screen resolution of 1920  1080 at 60 Hz.
Procedure. A trial began with a central fixation cross for
500 ms followed by a centrally presented shape-label pair for
100 ms. Participants had to make a judgment whether the
pairing of the shape and label matched the original associa-
tion they had to form, responding within a maximal response
time window of 3000 ms, during which a blank screen was
presented. They were instructed to make a response by
pressing one of two response keys on a keyboard as accurately
and quickly as possible. Feedback was given for 500 ms once a
response was made and then the next trial started. In each
block, the different experimental conditions were randomly
presented.
There were twelve or eighteen trials for practice respec-
tively before the two or three association experiment. After
practice, participants performed either three blocks of 60 trials
for the three associations (patient RR and controls) or three
sets of 40 trials for the two association task (patient SC and
controls) in the personal associative session. In the personal
associationereward association session participants per-
formed one block of 96 trials in each task. Thus, there were 30
trials for eachmatch andmismatch conditions in the personal
association session, and 24 trials for each match and
mismatch condition in the personalereward association ses-
sion. Mismatching trials were defined by the shape that was
present. There were 15 trials for each shape re-paired with
either one of twomismatched labels (e.g., 15 trials for the self-
associated shape re-paired with the ‘friend’ label and 30 trials
for the self-associated shape re-paired with the ‘stranger’
label) for the 3-pair person; association condition. In the 2-pair
association conditions (personal association and reward), the
re-paired stimuli were formed by combining each shape with
the label for the other shape.
Healthy controls. In order to test the standard self-bias ef-
fect, we had 12 age and gender matched healthy controls
perform the tasks: 6 matched to patient SC (age:
mean ± SD ¼ 63.83 years ± 3.49) (tested on the 2-person
associative task), and 6 matched to RR (age:
mean ± SD ¼ 27.33 years ± 7.37) (tested on the 3-person as-
sociation task). A different set of 12 age and gender-matched
controls also took part in the personal label-reward session;
6 were matched to patient SC (age: mean ± SD ¼ 59
years ± 10.56), 6 to RR (age: mean ± SD ¼ 25 years ± 6.00).
Data analyses. In order to test the self-bias effects across
controls and patients who either carried out two or three
personal associations, we only focused on the self-bias
indexed by the difference between the self and stranger as-
sociation, in the personal association session. In the person-
alereward association session, we examined the self-bias (self
vs stranger) and high-reward bias (high vs low reward)
respectively.
Firstwe assessed the standard self-bias/reward-bias effects
from healthy controls. The data on reaction times (RTs) were
separately reported for match and mismatch trials due to the
different responses being used. Perceptual sensitivity (d
prime) was also assessed based on the match and shape-
based mismatch trials (see Sui et al., 2012). We assumed that
controls would show the advantage in items associated with
c o r t e x 7 0 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 2e2 1 2206the self (and high reward) compared with those associated
with stranger (and low reward) condition in both the RTs and
d prime. We then conducted comparisons between the per-
formance of the patients and controls using Crawford's
modified t-test (for comparing a single case with a group of
controls; see Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford &
Howell, 1998), to examine whether patients showed signifi-
cant changes in the self-bias and reward-bias effects (either
reduced in the patients relative to controls [hypobiases] or
increased [hyperbiases]). In order to reduce individual differ-
ences in overall reaction times, the data were normalized for
each participant before running statistical analyses by calcu-
lating the ratio of the difference between the self and stranger
(or high and low reward) associations, relative to the sum of
the self and stranger (or high and low reward) associations.4. Results
4.1. The personal association session
Controls. For RTs onmatch trials, a repeated-measures ANOVA
with onewithin-subjects factore association (self vs stranger)
and one between-subjects factor e task (three vs two personal
association) was conducted. The analysis revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of association, F(1, 10) ¼ 62.61, p < .001,
h2 ¼ .86; there were faster responses to the self than toFig. 2 e Control data in the personal associative session. (A) Reac
stranger). (B) Performance in d prime as a function of the assoc
error.stranger trials. The main effect of task was also significant,
F(1, 10) ¼ 7.94, p < .02, h2 ¼ .44, there was better performance
for the three than two personal associations. This could reflect
differences in the ages of the controls (older for the two as-
sociation task, to match SC). There was no significant inter-
action between the association and the task, F(1, 10) ¼ .39,
p ¼ .55 (Fig. 2A). The data replicate the results of prior studies
(e.g., Sui et al., 2012) and show that the magnitude of the self
bias in normal participants does not change as a function of
whether three or two associations had to be formed. We also
conducted ANOVAs for the two and three personal association
tasks separately. The analysis on the two personal association
task showed a significant effect of association, F(1, 5) ¼ 90.25,
p¼ .001, h2¼ .96; therewere faster responses to the self than to
stranger trials. There was also a significant effect of associa-
tion in the three personal association task, F(2,10) ¼ 19.42,
p < .001, h2¼ .76; therewere faster responses to the self than to
friend (p ¼ .003) and stranger (p ¼ .01) trials, but there was no
difference between the friend and stranger trials (p ¼ .24).
The analysis for RTs on mismatch trials only showed a
significant main effect of task, F(1, 10) ¼ 7.96, p < .02, h2 ¼ .44,
which was similar to the results on match trials (RTs for three
associations < RTs for two associations). Neither the effect of
association nor the interaction between association and task
was significant, F(1, 10) ¼ 3.08 and 2.65, p ¼ .11 and .14.
For d prime, the analysis did not show a significant main
effect of association, F(1, 10) ¼ .24, p ¼ .63 but there was ation times (RTs, ms) as a function of the association (self vs
iation (self vs stranger). Error bars represent one standard
c o r t e x 7 0 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 2e2 1 2 207significant effect of task, F(1, 10) ¼ 23.01, p ¼ .001, h2 ¼ .70.
There was a larger d prime in the two relative to the three
personal association conditions. There was also a significant
interaction between the association and the task, F(1,
10) ¼ 7.99, p < .02, h2 ¼ .48 (Fig. 2B). For the three personal
association task, paired t tests demonstrated larger d prime
values for self relative to stranger trials, t(5) ¼ 4.29, p ¼ .005,
but there was comparable performance for self and stranger
trials for the two personal association task, t(5) ¼ 1.21,
p ¼ .29. For the d prime analysis, the self advantage emerged
for the tasks where more associations had to be formed (three
vs two associations).
Comparison between patients and controls. We conducted
Crawford's modified t-test using normalised scores (see the
Method section) to assess whether patients showed a self-bias
deficit compared to controls. For RTs on match trials, patient
SC showed a significant hypo self-bias deficit relative to the
controls performing the two personal associative task,
t(5) ¼ 13.36, p < .001 (Fig. 3A). In contrast, patient RR
demonstrated a significant hyper self-bias deficit relative to
age-matched controls performing the three personal asso-
ciative task, t(5) ¼ 2.72, p < .05 (Fig. 3A).
For d prime, similar to the data on RTs, patient SC showed a
significant hypo self-bias deficit relative to controls perform-
ing the two personal associative task, t ¼ 5.51, p ¼ .005
(Fig. 3B). In this case patient RR did not show self-bias deficit
relative to controls performing the three personal associative
task, t ¼ .66, p ¼ .54 (Fig. 3B).4.2. The personalereward association session
Controls. We first examined the effect of self-bias. Repeated-
measure ANOVAs with one within-subjects factor e associa-
tion (self vs stranger) and one between-subjects factor e age
(old controls for SC vs young controls for RR) were conducted
on RTs for match trials, RTs for mismatch trials, and d primeFig. 3 e The comparison in self-bias between the patients
and controls in the personal association session. (A) RTs
(ms) and (B) performance in d prime. The bars represent
the control data and circles represent each patient's data.respectively. The analyses did not show any significant main
effect of age and no interactions between association and age,
F(1, 10) < 1.38, p > .27. Data from all controls were therefore
collapsed. Paired t testswere then conducted for RTs onmatch
trials, mismatch trials, and d prime. The multiple compari-
sons were corrected by multiple Holm-Bonferroni corrections
for a ¼ .01 reflecting findings in prior studies (Holm, 1979; Sui
et al., 2012). The results showed a significant effect of associ-
ation on RTs formatch trials, t(11)¼6.24, p < .001; there were
faster responses to the self than stranger associations, in line
with the results in the personal association session (Fig. 4A).
There were comparable responses to the self and stranger
associations in RTs formismatch trials, t(11)¼ .92, p¼ .38. The
analysis for d prime failed to show a significant difference
between the self and stranger associations, t(11)¼ 1.78, p¼ .10
(Fig. 4B).
For the reward association task (Fig. 4B), there were no
significant age effects, F(1, 10) < 1.37, p > .28. Paired t tests
showed a high-reward bias on RTs for match trials,
t(11) ¼ 5.99, p < .001; participants responded faster to items
associated with high than low reward values (Fig. 4A). There
were no significant effects on RTs for mismatch trials or for
the d prime scores, t(5) ¼ .13 and 2.69, p ¼ .90 and .02
(Fig. 4B).
Comparisons between patients and controls. First we computed
the normalized self and reward bias effects. The self/reward-
bias in RTs for match trials for each participant was indexed
by the difference between the stranger and self conditions
(and the low and high reward conditions), dividing by the sum
of two responses then multiplying by 100 (Fig. 5A). For SC,
Crawford's modified t-test showed a marginally significant
hypo self-bias deficit relative to the age and gender matched
controls, t ¼ 2.28, p ¼ .04 (one-tailed). RR demonstrated a
significant hyper self-bias deficit relative to age and gender
matched controls, t ¼ 8.07, p < .001 (two-tailed). In the reward
association task, both SC and RR showed a significant hypo
reward-bias relative to age and gender matched controls,
t ¼ 1.94 and 3.47, p ¼ .06 and .009.
For d prime (Fig. 5B), SC showed comparable self-bias effect
compared to age and gender matched controls, t ¼ .06, p ¼ .96.
Likewise, RR showed similar effect of self-bias relative to age
and gender matched controls, t ¼ 1.85, p ¼ .12 (Fig. 5B). For
the reward-bias, both SC and RR showed comparable perfor-
mance when compared to age and gender matched controls,
t ¼ .25 and 1.68, p ¼ .81 and .16.5. Discussion
The data indicate that SC and RR had opposite changes in self-
bias in perceptual matching after their brain lesions. SC
showed a reduced self-bias compared with control partici-
pants (a hypo self-bias). RR in contrast had a larger self-bias
than that found in controls (hyper self-bias). The results
indicate that brain lesions can alter self-bias effects on
perceptual matching, though the effects differ according to
the lesion site. In addition to this, both patients showed
decreased biases to high reward stimuli (hypo reward-bias).
The results for RR are particularly striking, since, relative to
controls, he had opposite effects on the self- and reward-bias
Fig. 4 e Control data in the personalereward association session. (A) RTs (ms) as a function of the association (self vs
stranger, or high vs low reward). (B) performance in d prime as a function of the association (self vs stranger, or high vs low
reward). Error bars represent one standard error.
Fig. 5 e The comparison of self/reward-biases between the patients and controls in the perceptual matching tasks. (A) RTs
(ms) and (B) performance in d prime. The bars represent the control data and circles represent each patient's data.
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Fig. 6 e Patients JH (53 years old, female) and PS (81 years
old, female) show hyperbias for both the self- and high
reward-related stimuli. Lesions reconstruction using
voxel-based morphological analysis relative to control MR
scans illustrates the lesion over the left inferior frontal
region extending to the insula.
c o r t e x 7 0 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 2e2 1 2 209effects (respectively hyper and hypobias). This contrast sup-
ports the argument that the self- and reward-bias effects on
perceptual matching can arise from independent sources. We
return to this point in the General Discussion.
We note also that these results do not reflect the general
effects of brain lesion or the loss of executive control in the
patients. First, SC and RR showed opposite effects of self-bias.
Second, in similar analyses with patients with lesions
affecting the fronto-parietal executive control systemwehave
found that there is a pattern of hyperbias for both self- and
reward-related stimuli (see Fig. 61), consistent with a general
lack of task based control to salient (self- and high-reward)
stimuli along also with difficulty in responding to less strong
associations (stranger- and low-reward). The hypodeficits
observed in SC (self and reward) and RR (reward) dissociate
from the effects seen after fronto-parietal damage.
Experiment 2. Episodic memory
In this experiment, we assessed whether SC and RR not
only had changes in self bias in perceptual matching but also
in episodic memory. The patients classified objects as related
either to themselves or to a familiar other and then we tested1 Fig. 6 shows data from two patients, JH and PS, both of who
suffered damage to the left dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and
who presented with deficits in executive functions. For example,
both patients scored abnormally on the Hayling test of inhibitory
control and both made rule violation errors when carrying out the
Tower of Hanoi problem solving task and both were unable to
complete the task.recall, recognition of the order of the items and source
memory for the location where the objects were positioned.6. Method
Stimuli and tasks. Participants completed an object naming
task as a pre-test before the episodic memory task. Patients
were told to name objects taken from the 260 coloured object
pictures in Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) and after this
they evaluated the familiarity of each object based on a 3-
point scale (1-do not know, 2-name, not familiar, 3-name,
familiar). 120 items which the patients correctly named and
marked with 3 were selected and made into cards. 96 items
out of 120 were divided into four sub-groups e animals (e.g.,
ant, butterfly), animate objects (e.g., apple, flower), inanimate
indoor objects (e.g., bed, chair), and inanimate outdoor objects
(e.g., bike, flag) (see Sui&Humphreys, 2013). These itemswere
classified into 16 subsets each of 6 items.
Each patient underwent three memory tasks, recall items,
order and location of presentation, with each subset forming
one trial. The location task provided a measure of source
memory (where a recalled itemhad initially appeared). During
the encoding phrase, patients were presented with 6 items,
one at a time, in a random order. The prior stimulus was left
available as new one was presented in a different spatial
location. Participants were asked to associate all of the items
with themselves (on ‘self’ trials) or with a familiar other per-
son, chosen by the patients (on ‘other’ trials). Before each trial,
patients were told the type of trial (self vs other) and during
the encoding stage, they orally reported “this is my chair” or
“this is my friend's car”. After reporting the ownership for
each item, the experimenter put the cards upside down either
on the left or right in front of the patients who were asked to
remember the location of the items. The items were equally
often associated with the self and the other familiar person,
and counterbalanced across test sessions. After the items on a
trial were presented, the patients had to recall the stimuli.
Then the experimenter presented all the items again but in a
random order (the recall task). Patients were asked to point
the order of itemswhen theywere presented earlier (the order
task). After this, the patients had to report the location where
each item had been positioned. Each of the patients carried
out 2 to 4 blocks in each session which took around 45 min.
Each block consisted of 4 trials (2 self trials, 2 other trials) and
there were 3e4 sessions for each patient (depending upon the
testing time available for a session). In total patients per-
formed 10 blocks across 3e4 sessions. The interval between
two consecutive sessions was at least two weeks apart. We
treated each block as an individual participant to conduct the
statistical analyses for each patient (see Sui & Humphreys,
2013).
Healthy controls. In order to test the standard self-bias effect
in memory, we had 12 healthy controls carry out the above
tasks, 8 matched to patient SC (age: mean ± SD ¼ 61.88
years ± 4.02) and 4 to RR (age: mean ± SD ¼ 29.75 years ± 1.50).
Controls were tested in a single sessionwith 3e4 blocks. In the
analysis w treated each block per control as a subject, with
trials nested within subjects in the analysis.
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Controls. The controls showed better memory for items enco-
ded in relation to the self than for items encoded in related to a
familiar other across the three memory tasks, t(20) ¼ 2.54,
p ¼ .02 in the recall task, t(20) ¼ 2.20, p ¼ .055 in the order task,
and t(20)¼ 3.12, p¼ .005 in the sourcememory task. Therewas
a consistent self-advantage effect across the three memory
tasks (Fig. 7A).
Patients. The recall, order judgements and source memory
data were analysed using paired t tests. The multiple com-
parisons were corrected by multiple Holm-Bonferroni cor-
rections for a ¼ .01 (Holm, 1979; Sui & Humphreys, 2013). SC
failed to show any benefit to items encoded in relation to the
self compared to items encoded in relation to the familiar
other, and this held for the recall, order and source memory
tasks, t(9) ¼ .29, .45, and .17, p ¼ .78, .66, and .87 (Fig. 7B).
One problemhere is that SC's performancewas at floor in both
the recall (just above .20) and sourcememory tasks (about .50).
In order to test whether the lack of any self-advantage for SC
was due to his poor performance we tested another patient
stroke MM (male, 77 years old) who had an impairment in
verbal short-term memory (forward digit span ¼ 2). MM car-
ried out the recall and order tasks similarly to SC but with the
items on each trial reduced to 4 (Fig. 7C). With this reduced
load, MM's performance was comparable to SC in the recall
and order tasks. For the recall task there was a non-significant
trend for better performance for the self over other trials,Fig. 7 e Scores for the patients and controls in the recall, order
encoding instruction (self vs other). (A) controls, (B) SC, (C) MM,t(9) ¼ 1.78, p ¼ .11, but MM did show a reliable advantage for
items encoded in relation to the self compared with items
encoded in relation to the familiar other in the order task,
t(9) ¼ 3.51, p ¼ .007 (MM did not complete the source memory
task). The results indicated that the absence of self-bias in
memory from SC was not simply due to low overall
performance.
In contrast, RR demonstrated a consistent self-bias in the
three memory tasks, t(9) ¼ 2.75, p ¼ .02 in the recall task,
t(9) ¼ 5.67, p < .001 in the order task, and t(9) ¼ 3.55, p ¼ .006 in
the source memory task (Fig. 7D).
Comparisons between patients and controls. In order to
assess the memory deficit in patients compared to controls,
the self-bias in memory for each participant was normalized
in order to reduce individual differences in overall perfor-
mance. The self-bias was indexed by the difference between
the self and the familiar other conditions divided by the sum
of the two conditions (Fig. 8). Crawford's modified t-test for
SC showed a significant hypoself bias deficit in the recall
task compared to controls, t ¼ 2.04, p ¼ .03 (one-tailed), but
there was comparable performance between SC and controls
in the order and source memory tasks, t ¼ .93 and .87,
p ¼ .38 and .40. There was also comparable performance
between RR and controls across the three tasks, t ¼ 1.35,
1.06, and 1.84, p ¼ .20, .31, and .09. The data indicated that RR
had normal self-bias in memory after brain lesions, whereas
the brain lesion in the vmPFC and insula led to a hypoself
memory deficit in SC.memory, and source memory tasks as a function of the
and (D) RR. The error bars represent one standard error.
Fig. 8 e Comparisons of the self-bias effect between the
patients and controls in the recall, order memory, and
source memory tasks. The bars represent the control data
and the circles represent each patient's data.
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Patients SC and RR dissociated in the effects of self-coding on
episodic memory. For SC there was evidence of a reduced
(hypo) self-bias in recall. He also showed no evidence of a self-
bias on the order and source memory tasks; though in these
last cases the data did not differ from the controls, the con-
trols had reliable self biases in each case. RR, however,
demonstrated self-bias effects on the memory tasks that
clearly did not differ from the controls. The data indicate that
the vmPFC lesion suffered by SC mean that he could not
support memory by tagging to a self representation. In
contrast, RR could support memory in this way, despite the TP
lesions he incurred. Accessing self representations to support
memory does not depend on the TP regions lesioned in RR.9. General discussion
We have reported data on two patients with selective brain
lesions affecting areas previously associated with attention to
self-related information in perceptual matching (Sui et al.,
2013). SC had damage to the vmPFC (plus also the insula). In
both perceptual matching and episodic memory, SC consis-
tently failed to manifest self bias effects on his performance;
also the differences in responding to self-related stimuli
compared to stimuli related to a familiar other were reliably
smaller for SC compared with age and education-matched
controls. We conclude that SC had a hypo self-bias across
both low-level (Experiment 1) and higher-level tasks
(Experiment 2). These data contrast with results from RR. RR
showed different effects on perceptual matching and episodic
memory. For perceptual matching RR demonstrated hyper
self-bias effects (greater than those found in age andeducation matched controls). However for episodic memory
RR manifested normal (positive) self bias effects. For RR, then,
there was a dissociation across the different levels of task.
To account for these results we suggest that SC's lesion,
affecting the vmPFC, disrupted access to a core representa-
tions of the self, involved in low- and high-level tasks alike.
This argument fitswith substantial data frombrain imaging in
normal participants where the vmPFC is recruited by self-
related judgements across a variety of tasks, from making
ownership judgements through to matching a shape with a
self-related label (Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 2005; Sui
et al., 2013). In imaging studies, self-biases in perceptual
matching but not self-ownership judgements, have also been
linked to activity in the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS; Sui et al., 2013) e a region damaged in RR. In inter-
preting their imaging data, Sui et al. argued that the pSTS
mediated top-down attentional responses to socially relevant
stimuli, and hence showed a heightened activity in relation to
a self-related stimulus. Consistent with this, strong top-down
connectivity from the vmPFC to the pSTS predicted the
magnitude of the self-advantage in perceptual matching. We
propose that damage to the pSTS, in RR, reduces the capacity
for top-down attention to be tuned to the stimulus in the
perceptual matching task. With the reduction of attentional
control, attention is modulated more than usual by the strong
social driver of attention e the self-related stimulus: a hyper
self-bias results. In contrast, for the episodic memory task
there are few demands on attention as the stimuli were
sequentially presented and self-bias effects depended more
on whether each item could be linked to a core self repre-
sentation in the vmPFC. Given that RR's lesion falls outside the
latter region, this process remains intact (and the magnitude
of self-bias effects on memory is normal).
We also presented results on the effects of reward on
perceptual matching (Experiment 1). Control participants
show positive biases in matching, favouring high-reward
stimuli over stimuli associated with lower reward values.
The data for both SC and RR indicated hypo reward-biases e
that is the patients were less affected by reward than the
controls. For SCwemight argue that there is a commonsystem
for the self and reward that biasesprocessing towards self- and
high-reward associated items (see Northoff & Hayes, 2011).
However such a common-coding account is contradicted by
the results from RR who had opposite biases for the self and
reward (respectively hyper and hypo biases). One alternative
possibility is that the TP lesion altered the value levels asso-
ciated with reward, perhaps by disconnecting attentional re-
gions with sub-cortical areas important for coding value (e.g.,
the ventral striatum). Additional research is required to assess
this. The important behavioural point is that the biases
favouring the self and high reward can be fractionated in
perceptual matching and thus cannot be determined by fully
overlapping sources. The hypo reward biases apparent in SC
and RR also cannot be attributed to general effects of brain
lesions or loss of executive control, as patients with deficits to
the fronto-parietal executive network generate hyper biases
(Fig. 6). A final caveat is that the results are reported across
single cases and we need to exert caution, especially when
making inferences about the relations between the brain le-
sions and the behavioural symptoms e the results should be
c o r t e x 7 0 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 2e2 1 2212replicated in larger group studies. Nevertheless the results do
indicate that damage to the vmPFC can disrupt access to a core
self-representation mediates both low- and high-level tasks
while damage of the left TPC reduces top-down attentional
control to self-related stimuli, which particularly affects low-
level perceptual matching. These effects on self-bias can
dissociate from the effects of reward on performance.Acknowledgements
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